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Introduction
As this Handbook demonstrates, the phenomenon of addiction straddles
a dizzying number of fields of enquiry; even at a very coarse disciplinary
grain, it throws up biomedical, neurological, pharmacological, clinical,
social, legal, political, and moral issues, among numerous others. So
it is no surprise that the multitude of disciplinary perspectives, method-
ologies, terminologies, and research programs, all working at cross-
purposes, should generate conceptual misunderstandings and disputes.
Philosophy is, of course, dedicated as a field of study to the analysis
and clarification of such conceptual quandaries, and many of the par-
ticular issues that have arisen in the course of the interdisciplinary study
of addiction over the past few decades will be extremely familiar to
ethicists, metaphysicians, and philosophers of science. Philosophers
may address these problems directly; philosophical attention to them
can also be hugely beneficial to researchers in the range of other “stake-
holder” disciplines by increasing the conceptual consistency and rigor of
the insights they produce into the nature, treatment, and prevention of
addiction. Furthermore, philosophical analysis can help to integrate
different disciplinary approaches to addiction together, by elaborating
the range of possible metaphysical relations between various levels of
causation and epistemic relations between levels of explanation, as well
as by analyzing the relations between their distinctive frameworks and
definitions – facilitating, in effect, intertheoretical translation.
I begin this chapter by summarizing the historical views of the
major philosophers who have discussed or described addiction, whether
explicitly or in arguments clearly pertaining to it, as well as those who,
according to others, seem to have suffered from it. I then turn to the
literature of the past few decades, in which addiction has become a
specific topic of interest for philosophers. It would be beyond the scope
of this chapter (not to mention deeply tedious for the nonspecialist) to
provide a comprehensive review of this literature. Instead, I will focus on
four current debates about the concept of addiction, each of which
clearly invites philosophical analysis. The first concerns the scope of
the concept, and whether it should be restricted to substance abuse, or
expanded to cover, for example, sexual, gambling, or other behavioral,
compulsions. The second is the ongoing tension between biomedical
accounts of addiction, focussing on physiological and neural mechan-
isms and effects, and accounts which focus on social patterns of
addiction, for which they in turn seek social-level explanations. A third
concerns the question of whether addiction should be regarded as a
disease or not, while the fourth concerns the agency of addicts, and the
degree to which they can be regarded as being in control of, and respon-
sible for, their actions, or powerless to overcome their compulsions.
I will deal with these controversies in turn over the following
five sections. Each links to important ongoing debates in the wider
philosophical literature; I summarize those debates and the major pos-
itions within them, before showing their relevance for the understanding
of addiction and examining some of the ways that philosophers of
addiction have in recent decades applied them. Of course, there is a
considerable amount of overlap between these issues; the metaphysical
question whether addictions form a “natural kind,” for instance, hinges
in significant part on whether they possess some causal mechanism in
common, which in turn pertains to both the debate over whether addic-
tion is caused primarily by social or biomedical phenomena, and the
debate about compulsion, free will, and the moral responsibility of the
addict for her actions. Nevertheless, the issues have frequently been
unduly conflated too; the question whether addiction is a “brain dis-
ease,” for instance, is often regarded as settling whether or not addicts
are morally responsible. Separating the issues out as far as possible in
this way will allow us to gain maximum conceptual clarity, and the
connections can be noted in passing.
Addiction and the Ancients
The history of Western philosophy was memorably characterized by
Whitehead as “an extended series of footnotes to Plato” (1929), and,
certainly, a historical overview of any philosophical topic must start with
the Ancient Greeks. Addictive substances were certainly known to the
Greeks; Hesiod records the cultivation of poppies for their somniferous
juice, opion, which was recommended by such pioneering physicians as
Hippocrates and Galen, while alcohol – wine in particular – was of
sufficient cultural prominence to have its own God in the person
of Dionysos. Intoxication seems to have had religious significance too,
and the famous Oracle is now widely supposed to have made her
prophecies under the influence of a natural gas vent near the temple
at Delphi.
The Greeks were undoubtedly familiar with alcoholism and the abuse
of opiates, too; both Hippocrates and Galen, again, identified the causes
and symptoms of delirium tremens (Leibowitz, 1967). The philosophers
in particular will have been well-acquainted; Aristotle’s most famous
pupil Alexander the Great was legendary for his drunken escapades
and enthusiastic consumption of opium, and he may have hastened
his own mysterious early death by his prodigious over-indulgence.
Moreover, the “Symposia” described by Plato, in which Socrates and
others typically developed and expounded their philosophical views,
were lengthy after-dinner boozing sessions not at all similar to the
genteel modern staples of the academic calendar that bear their name.
And, as Bruce Alexander has pointed out (2008, p. 318), Socrates does
seem in Plato’s Republic to be describing something strongly akin to the
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stereotype of addiction in his discussion of “master passions,” which may
compel a man to expend:
whatever income he has . . . and next of course he’ll start borrowing and drawing
on capital . . . when he comes to the end of his father’s and mother’s resources. . .
he’ll start by burgling a house or holding someone up at night, and go on to
clean out a temple. Meanwhile [his] older beliefs about honour and dishonour,
which he was brought up to accept as right, will be overcome by others once
held in restraint but now free to become the bodyguard of his master passion. . .
His passion tyrannizes over him, a despot without restraint or law.
(2003, 573d–575a)
Yet it is not clear that the Greeks had any distinct concept of addiction, or
that addiction in its modern sense was a significant problem in Greek
society. At any rate, in the surviving writings of the Greek philosophers
we find no explicit discussions of addicts or addictive behavior.
What we do find, nevertheless, are discussions of concepts which
have shaped our understanding of addiction and moral responsibility ever
since. In Plato’s dialogue Protagoras, Socrates declares that it is impossible
for us to act in ways that we know we shouldn’t. “No one,” he states, “who
either knows or believes that there is another possible course of action,
better than the one he is following, will ever continue on his present
course” (2009, 358b-c). Like many philosophers’ pronouncements, this
seems straightforwardly false on first consideration; I know perfectly well
that I should finish my overdue draft of this chapter rather than going to
the pub for the evening, yet against my better judgement I go to the pub
anyway. But is this really “against my better judgement”? Certainly, I would
prefer to go to the pub; whatever I tell the volume’s editor, there is a clear
sense in which this seems the better option to me, which is why I do it.
Aristotle’s solution to this puzzle is to draw a distinction between our
reason and our appetites. If our moral education and development has
proceeded properly, reason and the appetites will be aligned; we natur-
ally want what is good for ourselves and others to have. This is, indeed,
the mark of the eudaimon; the “happy,” “excellent,” or “flourishing”
person who serves as the moral exemplar in Aristotle’s system. But if
our moral development has not been fully or properly formed, and we
have failed to achieve eudaimonia, our animal passions may be out of
kilter with our reasons. In this case, very few of us will be so thoroughly
corrupt or depraved that we cannot see the right course of action at all;
more likely we will recognize what is best but fail to desire it as we
should. Aristotle calls this condition akrasia or “weakness of the will”
(literally, “incontinence”); although we know what we ought to do, our
appetites point us to a different course of action, and we lack the strength
of will to overcome them. Moral education consists in large part of
developing the strength of will to resist our appetites, until they have been
realigned and acting rightly becomes “second nature” to us (2004, Bk VII).
In addition to our everyday failings – missing deadlines, skipping gym
sessions, having a second biscuit during a coffee break – akrasia has
been widely thought to illuminate the moral situation of addicts. We
don’t suppose that addicts are unaware that their actions are wrong; yet
nor do we judge those actions in the same way as we would if they were
carried out by a nonaddict. Addiction, on this view, is properly regarded
as a derangement of the appetites; the addict is not a moral monster or
ignoramus, but simply someone whose appetitive desires are too
uncommonly strong for them to overcome and observe the same moral
standards as the rest of us.
This line of reasoning was taken to its extreme – as philosophers are
wont to do – by the Stoics, who taught that all desire was at odds with the
virtuous life, which could be reached only by serene acceptance of one’s
lot. However, for our purposes the most notable thing about the Stoic
school is not the analgesic undertone of this doctrine, but one of its
prominent members; the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius, who appears
to have been the first significant philosopher who was himself an addict.
Administered opium by his physician Galen, Marcus’ seemingly bottom-
less appetite for the drug was recorded in Galen’s notes, and remarked
upon by his contemporaries, with his withdrawal symptoms at one point
conspicuously affecting the course of a military campaign (Africa, 1961;
Trancas, Borja Santos & Patrício, 2004).
Marcus was not the last philosopher of antiquity to succumb to addic-
tion. The great Persian philosopher and physician Ibn Sina (Avicenna),
perhaps the greatest intellect of the Islamic world, prescribed himself
enemas of opium poppy and celery seeds for the treatment of severe
colic, and is reported to have died following an overdose, perhaps
deliberately administered by larcenous slaves. Sina’s death was also
attributed by some observers to his compulsive sexual appetites, perhaps
indicating an addiction that embraced both substance and behavior.
By some distance the most remarkable such figure, however, is
St. Augustine of Hippo. More than any other, the figure who marks the
intellectual transition between the Greco-Roman and the Christian
worlds, Augustine is perhaps best known for his Confessions; a text that
is often regarded as the first autobiography. In it, he recounts the trauma
of being forced by his mother to abandon the mother of his child – his
beloved partner of eleven years – in favor of a more politically auspicious
marriage, and the years of compulsive promiscuity he was plunged into
as a result, before adopting chastity following a religious conversion.
Augustine seems to have had trouble controlling his sexual impulses
from a young age, his teenage promiscuity having been a source of
concern to his alcoholic mother and amusement to his philandering
father. At sixteen, he recounts, “the madness of lust. . . took complete
control of me, and I surrendered wholly to it” (2002, 24:2.2; cf. James,
1987; Soble, 2002, p. 561). To Carthage then he came as a student, as T. S.
Eliot wrote, “burning burning burning burning” (1922). For several years
in the great city he gave himself over to his desires, until the formation of
his exclusive relationship with the mother of his child, itself a “mere
bargain of lustful love" (Augustine, 2002, 52:4.2; Soble, 2002, p. 555).
He seems to have behaved stably for the duration of that relationship,
until it was broken by his mother’s ambition and an arranged marriage.
However, his bethrothed would not be of age to marry for another two
years, during which time – now a professor in Milan – he threw himself
headlong back into promiscuity. Augustine describes in excruciating
detail his inability to moderate his sexual appetites; no middle ground
was possible for him between a state of complete abstinence and one of
being completely “given over” – literally, ad-dicted – to his obsession
(Alexander, 2008, pp. 27–28; Bowers, 1990, p. 412). He describes, in
terms that would become familiar over the following centuries, the sense
of being inescapably compelled by his addiction:
The enemy held my will captive; therefore he kept me, chained down and
bound. For out of a rebellious will lust had sprung; and lust pampered
had become custom; and custom indulged had become necessity. These were
the links of the chain; this was the bondage in which I was bound, and that
new will which was already born in me, freely to serve you, wholly to enjoy you,
God, the only true joy, was not yet able to subdue my former willfulness,
strengthened by the wantonness of years. So did my two wills, one new, the











Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Exeter, on 16 Feb 2021 at 14:32:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
He recounts more and yet more reckless behavior in pursuit of his
addiction, rising to the coyly described extreme of a sexual encounter
during Holy Mass, a debasement which he believed “deserved death as
its reward” (2002, 3.3). Though he feels the pull of Christianity strongly,
he resists it because “(t)he plain truth is that I thought I should be
impossibly miserable if I had to forego the embraces of a woman”
(2002, 100–101; 6.11). Augustine is tormented, divided by his desire for
sex, and his desire to be free of it. Lord, make me chaste, he famously
prayed . . . but not yet.
If so many of the classic themes of addiction are already present in
Augustine’s story – family history and coaddiction, social and geographic
dislocation, guilt and self-loathing, doubt in one’s free will, even the
suspicion of moralising exaggeration – it ends with another: spontaneous
remission. In the terms of a much later vocabulary of addiction, he
embraced a higher power, abandoning his Manichaean beliefs, breaking
his engagement, and converting to Christianity. He renounced sex, was
ordained a bishop, and devoted his energies to writing. The Lord had
seen fit, finally, to make Augustine chaste.
Classifying Addiction
When we talk about “addiction,” it is not always clear how wide the
term’s scope is intended to be. Is alcoholism the same sort of thing, in
some relevant sense, as addiction to crack cocaine, or the habitual
abuse of prescription opioids? Most controversially, are addictions of
this putative sort – addictions to substances – relevantly similar to what
are frequently regarded as “addictions” to certain sorts of behavior, such
as gambling or sexual activity? And how closely do the classifications of
these phenomena suggested by science correspond to the everyday or
“folk” use of the term “addiction”?
In philosophers’ terminology, what we are asking here is whether or
not the addictions – or some subset of them – form a “natural kind”;
whether, that is, such groupings of conditions reflect real distinctions
and similarities in nature, or are simply artefacts of our human interests
and classificatory practices (Bird & Tobin, 2018). These poles delimit a
whole spectrum of positions in the debate; very broadly speaking, we call
those closer to the first “realist,” and those closer to the second
“nominalist.”
But to be more precise, we should distinguish two further broad
families of position. “Naturalists” believe, as realists do, that good classi-
fications “carve nature at the joints” like good butchers, in Plato’s famous
image (2005, 265e); the distinctions posited by our best conceptual
schemes correspond to genuine, objective distinctions in the nature of
the things classified. But naturalists are not thereby committed to the
view that the kinds or categories posited by those schemes thereby
“really” exist as abstract objects. So, the realist positions are a meta-
physically ambitious subset of the naturalist ones. That is to say, what
nominalists deny is not naturalism, the view that our classifications are
rooted in and reflect natural distinctions, but realism, the view that the
groupings thus classified exist abstractly. The view properly opposed to
naturalism is “conventionalism” which holds, in its various strengths,
that our classifications fail to reflect genuine distinctions in nature either
because such distinctions are unknowable to us (weak conventionalism)
or because no such distinctions exist (strong conventionalism). Again,
the conventionalist positions are a subset of the nominalist ones; it is
possible to be both a naturalist and a nominalist. Of course, one may
adopt different views of different classificatory schemes; to regard, for
example, positional distinctions between soccer-players – is Mohamed
Salah a winger or a wide-lying striker? – as useful but essentially arbitrary
does not commit one to taking a similar view about the chemical
elements.
There are a variety of reasons for supposing that “natural kinds” exist;
conversely, each of these imposes conditions on what can count as a
natural kind. The most influential such view is that natural kinds support
inductive inferences; familiarity with some members of the kind allows
us to make relevant predictions about the others, owing to their
natural similarities, while in turn it is frequently the ability to make such
inductive judgements reliably that alerts us to the existence of relevant
similarities. This is the view advanced by W. V. Quine, perhaps the
central figure in post–World War II US philosophy; we begin with a good
evolved ability to discern similarities, since “creatures inveterately wrong
in their inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die
before reproducing their kind” (1969, p. 126). However, the inductions
made possible by this “folk-psychological” ability allow us to develop
natural science, which goes on to inductively refine and supersede our
folk classifications by revealing deeper and more significant levels of
similarity, producing progressively better candidates for natural kindhood.
This view is notably liberal, since any natural property will permit
inductive inferences to be drawn and so count as supporting a natural
kind. Moreover, as Peter Godfrey-Smith observes, some inductive
inferences do not rest on shared properties or natural kinds at all; thus,
electoral polling requires only that the sample be sufficiently large and
drawn at random (2011). So this may be a necessary condition for
kindhood, but is not a sufficient one.
A more robust, and discriminating, variant appeals to the clustering of
such properties. In a multidimensional graph representing all the objects
in the world by dots, Ruth Millikan points out, taking each of their
properties as corresponding to a dimension, “all but very small areas of
the graph will remain empty” and “where not empty the graph would
contain mostly clumps of dots that were in close proximity along mul-
tiple dimensions, closely clustered in . . . property space. There would be
a clump that was all the rabbits, say, and another that was all the Gothic
cathedrals, . . . and so forth, and there would be, for the most part,
very sizable empty areas surrounding each of these clusters in most
dimensions” (2017, p. 12). A great number of these clusters, Millikan
speculates, will exist for historical reasons; they are formed because
objects are typically created by copying other existent objects in some
way. More generally, in Richard Boyd’s formulation, such clusters will
be supported by “homeostatic” mechanisms which in some way cause
the properties in the cluster to associate with each other, thereby making
divergent individuals comparatively unlikely to arise or persist. Homeo-
static property clusters are thus self-regulating, and support much more
robust, informative inductions; from some individual’s membership in
the cluster, we may infer a great deal more about its properties beyond
merely the visible ones which lead us to classify it (Boyd, 1991, 1999).
An alternative approach is to require that natural kinds support laws of
nature, rather than inductive inferences. Thus, the fact that some class of
items always and everywhere behaves in a particular way is explained by
the members of that class possessing the relevant properties. However,
this approach seems of limited use in the biological and social sciences,
which it is now widely agreed contain no exceptionless, nontrivial
generalizations of this sort (see e.g., Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999, p. 366).
A similar problem seems to afflict inductive accounts. The theory of
natural selection requires that there be considerable variation within any
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of the kind possess, over which inductive inferences may be drawn.
Cluster-based accounts can go some way to addressing this concern,
since kind-membership is determined not by possession of any particu-
lar property, but only of subsets of the clustered properties. But even
these accounts have trouble grounding inductive inferences over species
that display significant polymorphism; much of what we might infer from
observing Great Danes will not extend to Beagles, or Chihuahuas. Nor
will it do to simply locate our kinds at a different level, such as breeds,
since polymorphisms seem to cross-cut any such divisions; we can learn
even less about male angler-fish by observing female ones.
One solution to this conundrum begins by taking seriously Millikan’s
idea that the clustering of properties in biological kinds is the result of
the historical processes which formed them. What unites the members of
such kinds is not some (disjunctive) set of properties they possess, but
their common history. Seeing kinds as historical in this way allows us to
focus on several important features they possess. One of these is the fact
that their members’ characteristic features are not inevitable, but can
change over time; famously, the typical peppered moth became much
darker as the Industrial Revolution took hold of England, lightening
again when pollution reduced. Likewise, criminalizing – or legalizing –
a drug of addiction can radically alter the social profile of the addicted
population.
So, classifying a case as belonging to a kind does not, on this view, fix
its properties. On the contrary, as Ian Hacking (1995) has argued, what
the criminalization/legalization case shows is that human kinds tend
to be “interactive” rather than natural; any act of classification itself
produces “looping” feedback effects which alter the profile of the classi-
fied kind. To identify any group by some distinctive features its members
possess does not thereby bring it into existence – the features, of neces-
sity, already exist – but it does provide its members and those around
them with a new way to understand their lives. When “alcoholism” was
first identified as a kind, in other words, those with drinking problems
found themselves in a new conceptual world. Likewise, once we concep-
tualize problem gambling as an “addiction” – as Gamblers Anonymous
has long done, officially followed only since 2013 by the American
Psychiatric Association – we can expect such gamblers to be treated,
and to regard themselves, in a similar way to alcoholics and chain-
smokers; and, for better or worse, to behave (and perhaps to respond
to therapy) accordingly. And this may alter those features by which we
initially picked out the group beyond recognition. As Scott Vrecko (2010,
pp. 40–41; cf. Foddy & Savulescu, 2010a, p. 11) points out, members
of the kind “addict” were identified in the mid-twentieth century by
withdrawal symptoms. Yet as our understanding of the same group has
deepened and expanded, and as the group itself has responded, this has
become an inessential characteristic of the kind; we recognize many
addictions with no such symptoms, and cases of physical dependence
on drugs like Prozac, which sometimes are not considered addictions at
all. Similarly, the way we recognize afflicted groups can – through the
provision of clean needles, access to therapeutic resources, etc. – have
transformative effects on the overall health profile typical of their
members, including particularly the incidence of comorbidity with other
medical issues. Demanding that social welfare and healthcare recipients
pass drug-tests before accessing resources, or labeling them as morally
corrupted, conversely, may have a similarly profound, but negative,
effect on health and well-being.
What we are seeing here is the idea that classifications are extremely
contingent, perhaps radically so. According to Nelson Goodman (1978),
this is not just a feature of the human sciences, but of classification
generally. The world does not come prepackaged into categories; if kinds
are historical entities, then they must have beginnings and, in principle,
ends. For any given set of data, multiple classificatory schemes of equiva-
lent accuracy are available, and the choice between them is typically
made on grounds of convenience. Classification is not then a matter of
identifying or discovering the “correct” natural kinds already existing in
the world, but of “making” a conceptual world by identifying and
selecting relevant kinds for our purposes.
Hacking and Goodman are therefore both pluralists and nominalists
about kinds – they think there are a myriad of equally accurate potential
classificatory systems, none of them uniquely “real,” and the choice as to
which is appropriate is determined by the purposes to which we wish to
put them – but they are not conventionalists. The natural properties that
form the basis of classification are genuine, for all that they may be
altered by the act of classifying. It is just in respect of those properties
that such kinds do prove themselves useful for our purposes; the projects
of “worldmaking” (Goodman, 1978) and “making up people” (Hacking,
1986) are constrained by reality.
How much, then, rests on the kinds in question existing “abstractly”?
Perhaps not a lot (Glackin, 2012). Hacking himself describes his view as a
“dynamic nominalism,” but grants that one might just as well regard the
same position as a “dialectical realism, preoccupied by the interactions
between what there is (and what comes into being) and our conceptions
of it” (2004, p. 2). And certainly it is open to realists, too, to reject the idea
that there is a single, uniquely correct schema for the classification of
kinds in nature. One can choose, instead, to adopt a realist stance
toward kinds across the board, or “promiscuously.” John Dupré (1995)
argues that there are countless ways of classifying the world into real,
abstract kinds, all equally legitimate for some theoretical or inductive
purpose or other. This promiscuous realism is not a conventionalist or
nominalist view; it holds that genuine natural features of the world
differentiate the members of natural kinds from nonmembers, and
denies that the mere multiplicity of such groupings gives us any reason
for modesty about their metaphysical status. Better to take our folk and
scientific classifications at face value; when we say that groupings exist,
we mean that they exist, whether we are talking about “living things that
are vertebrates” or “living things that are kosher.” We may be concerned
with either, depending on whether the natural features we are interested
in have to do with physiology or religious law. The mere fact that two
phenomena are kind-mates, then, doesn’t necessarily tell us much
more about their similarities; what matters is whether the shared fea-
tures which underpin the kind are useful for diagnostic, etiological,
therapeutic, or other uses.
So much for the theory, let’s have the pay-off; what use is all of this
metaphysical musing for the study of addiction? A key dispute concern-
ing the terms of addiction research in recent decades has been the
question whether, when we talk about “addiction,” we are dealing with
one sort of thing, or many. Likewise within more narrowly grained
categories; are “substance addictions” or “drug addictions,” for instance,
one kind of phenomenon, or many? What is at stake in these debates is
the question of similarity between ostensibly different cases, and the
inductive generalizations that can be drawn over them as a result.
The answers to these questions matter because if cases are indeed
relevantly similar – if they are part of the same natural kind – then we can
profitably understand and treat them in similar ways. If the neuro-
biological phenomena characteristic of alcoholics resemble those of
sex addicts, say, then pharmaceutical or behavioral interventions
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And our understanding of the moral situation of alcoholics – the degree
to which they are or are not “responsible for their actions” –may likewise
clarify our attitudes toward those who engage compulsively in sexual
behavior.
The relevance of natural kinds is double-edged, then; if they are to be
useful, they should rest on underlying similarities between different
cases, and they should in turn justify treating those different cases
similarly. We can illustrate this with some concrete examples.
The American Psychiatric Association’s current Diagnostic and Statis-
tical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM-5”) groups disorders according
to outward phenomena involving “clinically significant disturbances of
cognition, emotion or behavior,” rather than the underlying biological or
neurological dysfunctions that they reflect (APA, 2013; Murphy, 2017).
This prioritizes diagnostic reliability over diagnostic validity; it is con-
cerned with categories that clinicians can identify consistently, rather
than categories which “really exist” (Hempel, 1994). Accordingly, it
defines a category of “Gambling Disorder” (previously “Pathological
Gambling”), where the patient indulges in gambling of a sort and to a
degree that causes significant problems for his or her life (e.g., Criterion
2; “Is restless or irritable when attempting to cut down or stop gambling”:
Criterion 8; “Has jeopardized or lost a significant relationship, job, or
educational or career opportunity because of gambling”). But critics have
charged that this overlooks the key explanatory fact about such gamblers;
despite the very different outward manifestation, their neurology
is strikingly similar to those of drug addicts. Those diagnosed with
Gambling Disorder typically “exhibit classic patterns of addictive behav-
ior as a result of a specific kind of dysfunction in their dopaminergic
reward system and consequent neuroadaptation impairing frontal
control circuits,” and critics therefore recommend “replacing the behav-
iorally derived concept of PG with the neuroscientifically anchored con-
cept of addictive gambling” (Ross et al., 2012, p. 200).
This reflects more practical concerns than a philosopher’s taste for
taxonomic precision. First, the DSM-5 criteria provide at best a fuzzy
basis for demarcating genuinely addicted gamblers from those who
merely gamble habitually or excessively (Ross et al., 2012, p. 201ff.;
Murphy, 2017; see also Sinnott-Armstrong & Pickard, 2013, Griffiths,
2013). Despite the outward similarities in their defining behavior, it is
crucial for the purposes of understanding and treating both groups to
recognize that their brains work in fundamentally different ways.
A classification combining them is likely to be profoundly misleading
on both scores; it therefore provides a poor basis for inductive general-
izations, if comprehension and treatment are our aims. Conversely,
recognizing gambling addiction as part of a broader natural kind, “addic-
tion,” adds to our understanding both of pathological gamblers and of
other substance and behavioral addictions. Most strikingly, from
1998 onwards it began to be recognized that the opiate antagonist
Naltrexone and other anticraving medications, widely used in treating
alcoholism and heroin addiction, were effective in reducing the compul-
sion of addicts to gamble (Vrecko, 2010, pp. 42–43). These drugs act
upon the endorphin and dopamine systems; that is to say, they have
similar therapeutic effects in drug addicts and gambling addicts (as well
as sex addiction, eating disorders, and kleptomania) because of similar-
ities in the brain chemistry of these groups that a purely behavioral view
of their conditions could not have predicted. Note again, too, how
induction and classification support each other here. We posit kinds
because we recognize underlying similarities among the members which
will support inductive generalization; and it is the success of those
generalizations that persuades us that the members are indeed similar
and the kind genuine, leading us to discover further useful similarities
(though see the methodological reservations expressed in Vrecko, 2010,
pp. 43–45).
Similar issues arise at every level of analysis and classification. Thus,
Jeremy Pober (2013) argues that substance addictions do not themselves
form a natural kind, since not all such “addicts” do share the relevant
brain chemistry. Cannabis addiction, he argues, does not affect
Dopamine type-2/type-3 receptor availability in the way that addiction
to other legal and illegal substances seems to; the relevant sort of
neuroadaptation doesn’t occur (2013, pp. 128–129). Nor does it share
several other neural mechanisms that have been posited as the basis of
addiction. So addiction – whether confined to substances of abuse or
expanded to include behavioral compulsions – does not look like a
natural kind; inductions drawn over the group will not be reliable for
cannabis addicts. This is not to claim that cannabis addiction is illusory;
Pober suggests splitting the kind into “S-addiction” and “T-addiction.”
But it suggests that interventions effective in one type of case may not
translate to other types, and that the degree of autonomy one sort of
addict displays may not reflect the moral capacity we can ascribe to
others. Alternatively, we might find that our generalisations do hold up;
in that case, the dissimilar properties Pober identifies will not have been
the ones supporting the natural kind of addiction after all.
There is a further wrinkle in our talk of kinds and induction. Human
kinds, according to Hacking, are interactive; they “loop,” and alter over
time. But chemical kinds, for the most part, do not. An addict is a social
being, who responds to being classified as an addict by altering his or her
behavior in various ways, some predictable and some not. But an addict
is also, if defined neurochemically or pharmacologically rather than
socially or behaviorally, a complex amalgam of biochemical reactions
and processes, which are not similarly responsive to our taxonomic
processes. So addicts are plausibly members of multiple kinds at once;
at any rate, there are multiple levels of causation which affect them, not
all of which are similarly dynamic, or responsive to the same things. An
addict’s underlying pharmacology may not loop at all, and there’s an
interesting and important question how much can loop without it; how
much it thereby constrains kind-behavior.
Addiction and Levels of Causation
This raises another vexed question in the literature: is addiction a social
phenomenon, or a biomedical or chemical one? In some sense, clearly, it
seems to be both; addicts are, like all of us, both social and biochemical
beings. But is one level of causation and explanation dominant over the
other? Might one perhaps be epiphenomenal, just a causally inert com-
panion of the other? Or do both work independently but in tandem, both
contributing in crucial ways to the addicted person’s behavior? I’ll try
to avoid getting involved in the scientific and empirical (and often
philosophical) debate about which view of the relation is right here;
rather, I’ll summarize some of the conceptual apparatus that philoso-
phers have developed to analyze questions of this sort, and how it may
bear on our understanding of addiction.
One of the defining tasks of philosophy, particularly as it has been
understood in the English-speaking world since the end of the nine-
teenth century, has been the analysis of how different vocabularies,
apparently concerned with the same subjects, are related (Brandom,
2008, chapter 1). How can we understand talk about modality – how
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actually is? What is the relation between brain events, like the firing of C-
fibers, and mental events, like the feeling of pain? What place have moral
and other reasons for action in the picture of the world and ourselves
revealed to us by natural science? And how exactly do the theories that
make up our sciences depend on the observational data our senses
accrue? The question of whether addiction is primarily social or pharma-
cological in nature seems to have this character. Indeed, it has close
affinities with the second and third of the puzzles above; the mind–body
problem and the problem of morality, respectively.
A first candidate relation for this sort of puzzle would be reduction.
That is, the vocabulary and any rules in one level of analysis might be
straightforwardly translatable into those of the other or shown to be their
logical consequence (Nagel, 1961). In this case, everything that can be
said about social and behavioral addiction-related phenomena might
have its correlate at the more fundamental neuropharmacological level,
where all causal and explanatory interest resides. But this surely cannot
be the case, and the view does not seem to have been advanced seriously
in the literature. Looping phenomena would seem to be inexplicable on
this view, as would the fact that – despite the similarities in brain
chemistry – alcoholics cannot simply substitute gambling for drink, nor
smokers relieve their cravings with theft or cocaine. And we would have
no way to understand the persistent comparative prevalence of addic-
tions in certain demographic groups rather than others. Instead, figures
like Leshner have contended that although addiction is a neurochemical
condition, it is one “for which the social contexts in which it has both
developed and is expressed are critically important” (1997, p. 46).
More unusually, something like a reductive relation might be plausible
in the other direction. On this view, all the interesting causal and
explanatory work would be done at the social and behavioral levels.
There are associated neurological phenomena, of course, because that
is simply how our minds and brains work, but their significance and
pervasiveness have been overstated by researchers wedded to an overly
materialist worldview. Something like this position is often suggested by
writers employing the rhetoric of a “myth” of addiction (Davies, 1997;
Hammersley & Reid, 2002); researchers, policy-makers, and the public
have been systematically misled by the idea that addictive behavior is
an inevitable consequence of neurochemistry, rather than a complex
of social and behavioral phenomena. Bruce Alexander, in his seminal
work on the concept of addiction, distinguishes a spurious “restrictive”
concept involving chemical compulsion – “a relic of 19th century
temperance doctrine that penetrated the 20th century dressed up as
medical or scientific knowledge [whose] origins are neither medical nor
scientific and [which] does not mesh well with contemporary know-
ledge” (Alexander & Schweighofer, 1988, p. 159) – from the true, broader
concept, a multivalent behavioral category caused throughout history by
recurrent patterns of social dislocation (Alexander, 2008).
Hanna Pickard is a philosopher who seems to hold a view of this sort
too, albeit rather more nuanced than this simple taxonomy suggests.
Data suggest that there are overwhelmingly two classes of addicts, she
argues; those with underlying psychiatric disorders and those whose
addiction “peak(s) in adolescence and early adulthood and then . . .
(resolve) permanently, without clinical intervention, by the late twenties
or early thirties” (2012, pp. 40–41). This in turn shows that addiction is
not a “chronic, relapsing neurobiological disease . . . characterised by
compulsive use” (2012, p. 41; I consider the conceptually separate ques-
tion of whether addiction is a disease in a section below) as the common
image suggests; for the second group, it is neither chronic nor relapsing,
whereas for the first group it is neurobiological, but not a disease of
compulsion. Rather, for those suffering from comorbid psychiatric dis-
orders, it is used “purposively: to alleviate severe psychological distress.
Consumption is a chosen means to desired ends. If the ends are no
longer as pressing, or alternative ways of achieving them are available, it
is possible to choose differently: Use is not compulsive” (2012, p. 42).
Building on the previous vocabulary: the class of “addicts” comprises two
discrete natural kinds, on this view, one of which is defined behaviorally
with no distinctive neurochemical characteristics, while the other has
neurological characteristics which are not distinctive to addiction, and is
again defined by the behavioral response of self-medication.
Reductive views imply that one apparent level of causation can, in
principle, be dispensed with entirely, or at least regarded merely as a
useful shorthand. If we want to acknowledge genuine causal influences
at multiple levels, some other relation is necessary. One candidate,
which has generated immense quantities of discussion among philoso-
phers while seeming entirely unknown to the rest of the world, is that
of supervenience (Kim, 1984; McLaughlin & Bennett, 2018). A set of
properties supervenes upon another just in case the first set of properties
cannot change without a change in the second. Consider the property
brittle. Panes of glass can be brittle – hard but easily broken – as can
fingernails, decorative ironwork, etc. Brittleness in each of these is a
matter of having a certain molecular microstructure. But brittleness does
not reduce to having such a microstructure; it is realized by decidedly
different microstructures in each case. The property of brittleness is thus
multiply realisable; but however it is realized in a given case, it cannot
change unless the microstructure changes. Any pane with the relevant
microstructure will be brittle. This provides another possibility; the
behavioral phenomena of addiction may supervene upon the associated
facts about brain chemistry. This will allow a correspondence between
neurochemical facts and behavioral ones, which still permits each a
significant measure of causal autonomy.
A similar candidate relation, which has been widely discussed in
recent years, is grounding (Bliss & Trogdon, 2016). Metaphysical
grounding, unlike supervenience, is directional. Supervenience is con-
cerned only with modal covariance; A-properties cannot change without
changes in B-properties. Grounding is concerned with the existence of
properties, or objects, or facts, “in virtue of” more fundamental ones. On
this view, behavioral phenomena such as compulsion are explained by
neurochemical phenomena; they happen as they do owing to what
occurs in the dopamine and endorphin systems. This reflects a shift
from a “flat” ontology, where all properties are equally basic, to an
“ordered” one, in which some exist or obtain in virtue of others doing
so (Schaffer, 2009, pp. 354–356). The neurochemical facts are “more
basic,” metaphysically speaking, than the behavioral ones; but the
behavioral ones are nevertheless causally efficacious as well. In this case
there will be a behavioral kind because there is a neurochemical kind.
Grounding also seems particularly suited to the analysis of social
kinds; according to the schema outlined in a recent book by Brian
Epstein (2015), social facts can hold in virtue of – be grounded by – some
more basic underlying facts just in case a convention known as a “frame
principle” exists establishing that grounding relation. And the facts
establishing that convention are termed its “anchors.” So, for instance,
a certain piece of paper (“Billy the dollar bill”) is legal tender; this social
fact is grounded by the fact that Billy is printed in a certain way by the
Bureau of Engraving and Printing. And it is grounded by this fact because
the framing principle that all such papers printed by the BEP are legal
tender is anchored by further facts about the operative statues, acts of
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might be grounded by neurochemical facts about the brains of addicts
because of framing principles themselves anchored by further facts
about the law, social deprivation, genetic susceptibility, the availability
of addictive substances, and so forth (Glackin, 2019). This approach
allows us to describe and analyze a reticulated, multilayered range of
cross-cutting causal relations between different, causally autonomous,
kinds and their associated facts.
In such an intricate causal scenario, however, philosophical worries
about ontological priority may add an unnecessary extra level of com-
plexity. What matters from the point of view of both research and therapy
in addiction is causal efficacy; which phenomena are doing which work.
So, a less unwieldy way to capture this same intricacy is to follow the
heuristic principle that Philip Kitcher terms “causal democracy” (2003).
Developed initially to help analyze the complicated patterns of causal
interaction between genes and environment in biological development,
the principle holds that such questions cannot be satisfactorily answered
by aprioristic metaphysical or methodological assumptions, but only by
careful and patient case-by-case empirical research, which gives every
causal factor its due. Causal democracy does not hold that all factors
are equally important, or of equal metaphysical standing; it espouses
equality of opportunities rather than of outcomes (Griffiths, 2016, p. 74;
Stotz & Griffiths, 2016, p. 148), demanding only that “if the effect E is the
product of factors in set S, then, for any C ϵ S, it is legitimate to investigate
the dependence of E on C when the other factors in S are allowed to
vary” (Kitcher, 2003, p. 290). Let a thousand research programmes
bloom, in other words; and let all eschew “the usual preference for overly
simple, often monocausal explanations,” at least until inquiries are con-
cluded (Griffiths, 2016, p. 76).
Addiction as Disease
One persistent question in the literature concerns whether or not addic-
tion is, or should be regarded as, a brain disease (e.g., Alexander, 2008;
Foddy & Savulescu, 2010a; Leshner, 1997; Levy, 2013). But this question
appears to conflate two others; whether or not it is principally neuro-
chemical, a condition of the brain, and whether or not it is a disease. The
first of these was dealt with in the previous section, albeit to no firm
conclusion; I consider the second, which has not been much considered
in the literature (notable exceptions are Foddy [2010] and Segal
[2013]), here.
To know whether or not addiction is a disease, one thing we need to
know is what it means for something to be a disease. There are three
principal accounts of disease in the philosophical literature, plus an
additional one which we should consider in this context. These can
be subdivided into “naturalist” theories, which regard disease as a
value-free, objective concept, and “normativist” ones, which regard it
as inherently evaluative, so that it is an intrinsically bad thing for one
to have a disease, even if – as when a very minor complaint such as
bone-spurs prevents one from being conscripted and losing one’s life at
war – it is on the whole beneficial.
The most influential account of disease, and certainly the most dis-
cussed, is the Biostatistical Theory of Disease (BST) first advanced by
Christopher Boorse (1975, 1977). Boorse’s theory is a naturalistic one; its
criteria purport to be value-free, and to appeal only to entities and
quantities that can be observed and measured by the methods of the
natural sciences. According to Boorse, disease can be defined as the
absence of health, where health is regarded as statistical normality of
function. Function here is defined “causally”; an organ or trait’s function
is whatever contribution it typically makes (according to the “species
design”) to the body’s overall operation. Now, merely taking a statistical
average across the whole population will produce some unwelcome
results. For instance, almost all males will have higher levels of testoster-
one, and almost all females less, than the statistical norm. Likewise, since
heart-rate drops steadily as one ages, the population mean will not
produce a useful figure for young or old people. Accordingly, Boorse
takes the relevant statistical norm to be that displayed in a reference class,
or an age-group of a sex of a species.
There have been numerous objections to, and defenses of, the BST,
which I will not attempt to summarize here. Our question is: does
addiction, by the BST standard, count as a disease? It seems likely to; it
represents in all age-groups a departure from normal functioning in
several respects which are usually profoundly deleterious for the addict.
It shortens life and impairs life-chances, it greatly increases the risk of
several other diseases, and it represents in itself a severe impairment in
the person’s functional ability to make and act on rational choices. One
worry we might have concerns the relativizing of the standard to the
reference class; if almost all members of a demographic group smoke or
drink alcohol to excess, does that addiction thereby cease to count as a
disease? Boorse accounts for such “universal disorders,” however, by
appealing again to the species design. In some cases, he writes – dental
caries and arteriosclerosis, for example – the entire reference class may
have its functional ability limited by comparison to the species design
because of environmental influences (Boorse, 1977, p. 567). So addiction
will count as an impairment of normal functioning either relevant to the
reference class’s statistical norm or, failing that, for the class as a whole in
an adverse environment.
One objection is worth mentioning here, however, since it directly
concerns addicted populations. As Elselijn Kingma has pointed out
(2007), the liver function of alcoholics, or the lung function of smokers,
will differ from that of the wider population in just the same way that the
body-fat percentages of males and females, or the heart-rates of the
elderly, will. We account for the latter cases by relativizing to a reference
class, and saying that someone has a normal body fat percentage for a
male, or that so-and-so’s heart-rate is in the normal range for someone of
her age. Why not say in the same way: Nigel’s liver functions well for an
alcoholic? The answer seems straightforward; alcoholism is a disease,
whereas being male or female, or elderly, is not. But remember that the
reference classes were to be used to give us an objective, value-free
account of what disease is; they cannot, on pain of circularity, themselves
be based on our intuitive sense of which conditions do and do not count
as diseases.
The main alternative biomedical account of disease is properly speak-
ing a normativist account, though it is sometimes regarded as a hybrid
one, having both a normativist and a naturalist element. The Harmful
Dysfunction Theory (HDT), developed by Jerome Wakefield (e.g.,
Wakefield, 1992), combines the judgements that a condition represents
a dysfunction (naturalist) that is harmful for the patient (normativist).
“Dysfunction” here is understood in a different sense from the BST;
Wakefield appeals to the “etiological” or “selected effect” function
developed by Ruth Millikan (1989). On this view, the function of a trait
or organ is whatever it has evolved to do; specifically, whatever task its
precursors having performed in the bodies of the organism’s ancestors
helps to explain its current presence and configuration. A disease, in
turn, will be where any trait or organ does not function in the way it has
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Does addiction qualify on this score? It is controversial on both counts.
Certainly, most addictions are harmful, though the addict may not
always think so at the time (see below). But is an addiction intrinsically
harmful – is a harmful effect a necessary condition of addiction? It
certainly seems conceptually possible for some addictions to be benign,
or even beneficial. That, at any rate, is what I tell myself about my
morning coffee. Indeed, all addictions arguably are functional; they do
something positive for the addict, and then do something negative to the
addict. So unless harmful to the individual, addiction will not count as a
disease on Wakefield’s view. Many will find counterintuitive, though, the
idea that the same neurochemical response to the same substance may
in one circumstance be a disease, and, in another, not.
Does addiction represent a dysfunction in Wakefield’s and Millikan’s
evolutionary sense? Perhaps. However, a number of studies have sug-
gested that addiction is evolutionarily significant; that humans and psy-
choactive plants may have coevolved, or that humans have developed
specific adaptations (e.g., for metabolizing alcohol; Durrant et al., 2009).
This raises the possibility that addictive behavior may be functional; it
may reflect an evolved response to adverse social environments. This
conjecture is extremely speculative. But if it is true, we cannot use the
HDT to classify addiction as a disease however harmful it may be, as it
would then represent the system functioning in the way it was designed
to (Levy, 2013).
What is the alternative to a biomedical account of disease? It, too, may
be better regarded as a social kind rather than a natural kind. After all,
even if there is some natural property that asthma, fractured scaphoids,
prostate cancer, and myopia possess in common, it is far from clear that
such a property is anything like what we have in mind when we class
them together. Rather, we think of those with such conditions as having
suffered a misfortune of some kind, as being in a bodily state that is
disvalued in certain ways, of experiencing their body in a disrupted
fashion, or as being the proper objects of medicalized practices in our
society (e.g., Engelhart, 1976; Glackin, 2010, 2019; Nordenfelt, 2018). Such
views are termed social constructivist (or social constructionist); they
assume that the diseases are a kind constructed on the basis of a certain
sort of social status which its members share. Moreover, insofar as there
are underlying physiological similarities between cases of disease, this is
because the classification reflects a social effort to direct the attention of
the medical profession to the treatment of those physiological features.
On this view, the disease status of addiction will hang on social
attitudes to addicts and their status. And this may be a double-edged
sword. One of the things we typically intend by calling something a
disease is to entitle those afflicted by it to a certain moral status; we
devote resources to their treatment or protection, and excuse the incon-
venience their condition causes for others as beyond their control. But
this “social justice” aspect of the disease concept, which seems to be
conspicuous in many of its invocations by addiction researchers, is not
on offer from a social constructionist account of disease. That is to say,
the constructionist takes the relevant evaluative attitudes to precede the
classification rather than to follow from it, so the classification cannot be
used to justify holding those attitudes (Kukla, 2014). Moreover, the status
of disease may itself be regarded as stigmatizing, or to reflect stigmatiz-
ing social attitudes. We can usefully compare the history of homosexu-
ality’s classification here; its declassification as a psychiatric disorder was
both a major step in destigmatizing it, and a reflection of large-scale
change in stigmatizing social attitudes toward gay people. On the other
hand, its initial classification as a psychiatric disorder, prior to which it
had been regarded as merely immoral, licentious behavior, was similarly
hailed as a move against stigmatization and a reflection of newly enlight-
ened social attitudes. So it is plausible that addiction might follow the
same moral trajectory over time, depending on the progress of the
debates summarized in the next section.
One final theory of disease is worth considering here, not least for its
connection to the issues of free will and choice, which the next section
discusses, though it does not command a significant following among
serious contemporary philosophers of medicine (though Pickard [2009]
is a sympathetic reinterpretation by an important philosopher of
addiction). The Hungarian “anti-”psychiatrist Thomas Szasz, following
the nineteenth-century doctrine of Rudolf Virchow, held that the “gold
standard” for disease was the presence of lesion, or damage to physical
tissue (Szasz, 1960; Virchow, 1860). Szasz, a radical libertarian politically,
meant this not as a vague metaphor, but as a very specific one; he
abhorred the proliferation of “fiat money” not backed by gold reserves
(Szasz, 2006). In analogous fashion, Szasz decried the false currency –
the “myth” – of mental illness; since the mind is not the kind of thing
which can have lesions, he argued, it is not the kind of thing which can
become ill. “Mental illness” is not therefore a medical category at all, but
rather a pretext for the use of medical institutions to repress behavior
that society finds disgusting, inconvenient, or otherwise unacceptable.
This is not to say that there cannot be brain diseases; the brain can have
lesions the way any other physical organ can. So insofar as addiction is a
distinct neurochemical kind, it may count as a disease. But insofar as it is
social and behavioral, it is merely a “problem of living.” The addict is
somebody who makes choices to behave in particular ways, for his or her
own reasons. The behavior is distinctive insofar as it displays a high
degree of inelasticity (Foddy, 2010, p. 27); the addict continues acting
on the same preferences, even when the costs of doing so are very
considerable. But this is simply unusual economic activity, which the
rest of us may disapprove of, but have no legitimate basis to restrict.
To smuggle our moral attitudes under cover of a medical – and thus
implicitly scientific or objective – classification would according to this
perspective be to act both unjustly and in patently bad faith.
Addiction and Moral Agency
This brings us on, finally, to the issue where philosophers may have the
most obvious contribution to make to debates over addiction; the prob-
lems it raises regarding morality, responsibility, and free will. Addicts
regularly perform actions that, in isolation, would elicit unequivocal
moral condemnation. And the fact of addiction is almost universally
taken to qualify our attitudes toward the perpetrators in at least some
regard; heartbreaking, degrading scenarios, and the sequences of events
which bring them about, become “tragic,” rather than “evil,” failures of
society and its support systems rather than failures uniquely attributable
to the particular individuals involved. This can be double-edged; treating
addicts as thereby lacking in moral agency may mitigate their wrong-
doing, but often at the cost of regarding them as less than fully human, as
less than full participants in a moral society in which we are accountable
to others for our actions.
As is often the case in philosophy, a good place to start is to revisit the
discussions of 2,000 years ago, since the question of akrasia continues to
loom large over contemporary discussions, particularly since its revival
in recent decades by R. M. Hare (1952, 1963) and Donald Davidson
(1970, 1982); for a particular application of Davidson’s argument to
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for the “orthodox conception” of addicts as acting under compulsion,
and unable to control their urges, is what might be called “common-
sense” Socratism (Pickard, 2018). If a person knows their action will have
unacceptable consequences, we suppose, and can avoid doing it, then
they will avoid doing it. Ergo, the reasoning goes, since addicts are surely
aware of the negative consequences of their actions, it follows that they
must lack self-control. And if somebody is not in control of their actions,
they cannot be responsible for them.
But absolving addicts of any responsibility in this way strikes most
people as both morally and factually wrong. Various scientific studies
have cast doubt upon the idea that addicts are lacking in the neurological
capacity for self-control, while only minimal personal acquaintance or
sociological study is necessary to debunk the image of addicts as
automatons driven only by amoral compulsion; and we know that many
addicts do succeed in quitting without intervention. So it cannot simply
be the case that addicts are, per se, unable to control their actions. We
must suppose, then, either that they are akratic – being aware of the
wrongness of actions but failing to refrain from them accordingly – or
that they are in some way unaware of the actions’ wrongness. Of course,
this simply demarcates three extreme limits of the debate; most views of
addiction will hold some combination of them, in more-or-less
qualified form.
While it is commonly assumed, there is surprisingly little explicit
defense of the “common-sense” view in the literature. Perhaps this
should not be surprising; nobody gains tenure by arguing for what
everyone already knows. So the majority of critical opinion inevitably
runs against the popular stereotype, the pantomime character of The
Addict (Pickard, 2016, p. 454). Nevertheless, the contrast in this regard
with major philosophical writers of earlier generations (e.g., James, 1890)
is striking.
One observation about addiction worth taking seriously, then, is that
the substance or behavior of choice really may seem genuinely beneficial
to the addict. That is, we take the Socratic inference – if acting freely,
people will act as it seems to them for the best – seriously, but perform a
modus ponens rather than amodus tollens over it; we don’t reject the idea
that they are acting freely, but that they are failing to act in the way that –
all things considered – seems to them best. Bruce Alexander (2008)
points to persistent patterns of social dislocation that have, across geog-
raphy and history, been accompanied by widespread phenomena of
addiction. And his seminal experiments on rats appear to support the
view that addictive behavior is heavily contingent on an impoverished
environment (Alexander et al., 1981). Similarly, Hanna Pickard claims,
the majority of addicts who are not afflicted by comorbid psychiatric
disorder appear to recover permanently from the condition without
intervention as they reach their late twenties or early thirties (Pickard &
Pearce, 2014, pp. 166–167). Those who are so afflicted, moreover, are
principally using the substances they do as “a way of coping with psy-
chological distress” (p. 170). So the strong preferences displayed by
addicts simply reflect the fact that substance abuse – or gambling, or
promiscuous sexuality – seems to them the best response to their current
circumstances; when circumstances improve, they cease to prefer that
sort of response. Bennett Foddy and Julian Savulescu accordingly give a
strikingly simple “liberal” account of addiction; “an addiction is a strong
appetite” (2010b, p. 35; see also Foddy & Savulescu, 2010a, pp. 14–15).
What are the implications of this view for the moral responsibility of
addicts for their actions? It might seem, at first glance, to give them full
responsibility; if they are not under compulsion, then they are in control
of their actions, and can be held accountable for their choices, and their
failure to assess the best course of action. But the causal antecedents
of addiction are not under an individual’s control; the addict cannot
reasonably be blamed for experiencing psychiatric disorder or social
dislocation, and so for finding themselves in a situation where the best
course of action seems as it does. This raises a problem, which philoso-
phers have termed “Moral Luck” (Nagel, 1979; Williams, 1976); it is
widely assumed that we are morally assessible only to the extent that
what we are morally assessed for depends on factors under our control,
yet it also frequently seems correct to morally assess us for things that are
out of our control. Thomas Nagel distinguished four kinds of luck that
might bear on moral assessment: resultant luck, or “luck in the way one's
actions and projects turn out”; circumstantial luck, or “the luck involved
in "the kind of problems and situations one faces”; causal luck, or
“luck in how one is determined by antecedent circumstances”; and
constitutive luck, or the luck involved in one's having the “inclinations,
capacities and temperament” that one does (Nagel, 1979, p. 28). The last
three of these seem clearly pertinent to the moral position of addicts.
According to Nagel, the problem exposes a general issue with the possi-
bility of moral assessment:
The area of genuine agency, and therefore of legitimate moral judgment, seems
to shrink under this scrutiny to an extensionless point . . . in a sense the problem
has no solution, because something in the idea of agency is incompatible with
actions being events, or people being things. But as the external determinants of
what someone has done are gradually exposed, in their effect on consequences,
character, and choice itself, it becomes gradually clear that actions are
events and people things. Eventually nothing remains which can be ascribed
to the responsible self, and we are left with nothing but a portion of the larger
sequence of events, which can be deplored or celebrated, but not blamed or
praised.
(Nagel, 1979, pp. 35–37)
Various attempts have been made to resolve this problem. Pickard
(2017), for one, outlines a framework for “responsibility without blame”
allowing genuine moral agency to be acknowledged while nevertheless
refraining from hostile or stigmatizing attitudes toward the affected
individuals; though she confesses to initially having “no idea how this
stance was so much as conceptually possible” (p. 174), Pickard describes
in detail its functioning in a therapeutic community where she worked.
And while the theoretical details require a great deal of further elabor-
ation within the philosophy of action literature, philosophers should be
wary in the extreme about dismissing from the couch as a-priori con-
ceptually impossible what practitioners observe in the field.
Another possible resolution, advanced by Chandra Sripada (2018),
concerns the ubiquitous phenomenon of fallibility. All complex human
activity, he notes, however expert the practitioner, carries a nonzero
possibility of failure due to error; even Homer nods, as the saying goes.
The recovering addict typically faces a constant stream of drug-directed
desires, each of which individually requires significant cognitive effort to
overcome; their cumulative effect is therefore to significantly raise the
probability of a failure of self-control. Thus, Sripada argues, it can be
simultaneously true that each individual drug-directed desire is fully
resistible by the addict as a free moral agent, and that the addict’s overall
ability to resist eventually succumbing to those desires and relapsing is
greatly diminished.
So, there is a seeming tension between acknowledging the freedom of
agency addicts possess, mitigating the actions they nevertheless take,
and attributing to them a full understanding of those actions’ conse-
quences. The Aristotelian solution, of invoking akrasia, is a tempting
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of this thesis; addicts’ judgement may shift temporarily to make the
pursuit of addictive preferences seem temporarily to be the best course
of action, even if at other times they would not endorse those decisions.
Again, he argues, this may also explain the phenomena of addicts
“maturing out” or of ceasing to act compulsively when removed to a
significantly different environment (as with many of the heroin-using
US servicemen who returned from Vietnam in the early 1970s); the
“judgement-shift” is a response to particular environmental circum-
stances (Levy, 2011; see also Ainslie, 2000). Richard Holton presents a
slightly different understanding of akrasia as a mismatch between values
and desires; the addict is somebody who exhibits “an almost complete
disconnection between judging an outcome good and wanting it, or,
conversely, between judging it bad and not wanting it” (2009, p. 109;
see also Holton, 1999).
Lubomira Radoilska’s rival account counters that the Holton analysis
“is best understood as an unsuccessful attempt to tackle akrasia. . . a
secondary failure of intentional agency which follows from and is partly
explained by the primary failure that it tries to redress” (2013, p. xi). On
Radoilska’s view, true akratic action is successful insofar as it brings
something intended about, but fails insofar as it is wrongly aimed, and
thus both intends and brings about something other than what the agent
truly values. This suggests, in classic Aristotelian fashion, that addiction
reflects a failure of development; moral actors who have matured in the
species-appropriate way will not experience this sort of mismatch
between their intentions and their “true” aims. But those who have not
reached this point successfully, and so display “evaluative immaturity,”
can even find themselves acting akratically when the behavior in ques-
tion is “devoid of pleasure. Paradoxically, this is what accounts for the
sense of compulsion typically associated with addiction,” but not with
my blown deadline, or skipped workout (p. xi).
According to Gideon Yaffe, Holton and others wrongly interpret what
neuroscientific data are available in characterizing addicts in this way.
Like Levy, he takes it to show that addicts, “at the time of action, value
what they choose.” And this, he argues, shows that “addiction influences
what people do intentionally by working through, rather than against,
the valuing system” (Yaffe, 2013, p. 194). In turn, he takes this to show
that the moral situation of addicts is not dissimilar to that of victims of
duress, who “find themselves valuing criminal conduct more than they
value refraining from such conduct. And like those under duress, and
unlike those with such values who are not under duress, addicts have the
values they have thanks to the fact that they bear burdens that are not,
themselves, reflective of morally or legally objectionable attitudes on
their parts” (p. 195). But addiction is not, says Yaffe, a form of duress,
wherein “(i)t is not that they cannot comply; it is, rather, that they cannot
be expected to bear the burdens of withdrawal that compliance would
lead them to suffer” (2011, p. 116). If this is indeed the way that duress-
based accounts work, as most of the literature has assumed (e.g., Husak,
1999; Morse, 2000; Watson, 1999), then they seem unlikely to be suc-
cessful; only a small number of the range of conditions widely regarded
as addictions involve anything like withdrawal symptoms, which are
consequently no longer widely appealed to – as we have seen – in
characterizing addictions. Moreover, it is not empirically clear that
withdrawal-avoidance does play any significant motivational role in
addicts’ reasoning.
But while this corresponds to the classical legal doctrine of duress,
there is another view, which may avoid these problems and has not been
widely discussed in the addiction literature. In an influential article,
Patrick Atiyah (1982) argued that the classical doctrine did not well
characterize the emerging case-law on economic duress. A better view
than the idea that the agent’s will was “overborne” in duress cases, he
argued, was to recognize that while the agent had been presented a
genuine choice, it was not the choice facing most agents, but one
between evils. The problem with contracts entered into under duress is
therefore not that the agent has not consented, but that she has been
wrongfully faced with a set of choices in which the usual reasons not to
behave in some particular way have been superseded. A duress-based
account of addiction along these lines would thus acknowledge the
patient’s freedom of action but recognize that the “motivational space”
she inhabits is radically different from that familiar to most people.
This brings such accounts into close proximity with a rich philo-
sophical literature on the possibility of mutually inaccessible and
incomprehensible ways of experiencing and inhabiting the world. Some
philosophers have dismissed the very possibility as incoherent;
according to Donald Davidson (1974), the description of such radically
different “conceptual schemes” is self-defeating, since we could only
recognize and assert their existence in the event that we could, after
all, comprehend them. (To see the force of this objection, consider the
commonly cited problem with Internet “listicles” with titles such as
“20 words in foreign languages that can’t be translated into English”;
by explaining the terms to the (anglophone) reader the author has,
precisely, translated them, thereby contradicting his premise). But
countless others have found this a fruitful way of understanding various
phenomena. One of these was Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose influential
notion of “forms of life” organized and made internally comprehensible
by their characteristic “language games” (Wittgenstein, 1953) has been
usefully applied by Peg O’Connor – herself a recovering alcoholic – to the
lived world of addiction, and its contrast with that of sobriety:
In many ways, I think active alcoholics have a form of life different from that of
recovered alcoholics, as well as from that of non-alcoholics. The world we all
share is the same in important respects. But in some deep ways, the lived world
and its meanings are radically different. Consider some differences between
people with long-term sobriety and those who are actively alcoholic, or even
newly entering a recovery program. An unrecovered alcoholic often can’t even
understand the alcoholic who says, “Your life will be better without alcohol. You
will like yourself more. You will have more friends and a lot more fun.” To the
unrecovered, people in recovery can seem preachy and sanctimonious. Early on,
no matter how many times and in how many ways a long-timer says this, what
the unrecovered person hears is more like, “Blah, blah, serenity. Blah, blah, blah,
serenity,” as a great Gary Larson cartoon reminds us.
Non-alcoholics can’t fathom alcoholics, those of us who would risk our
livelihoods, families, and whatever else we hold near and dear in order to drink.
We can offer huge chains of reasoning that make sense to us, and to other
alcoholics. But to non-alcoholics, unless they’ve been enlisted in enabling us, we
can seem to be beyond logic and sanity.
(Morris, 2011)
A very recent trend in the philosophical literature, which provides
another useful way to think about these issues, concerns the nature of
“transformative experiences.” Beginning with L. A. Paul’s analysis of the
experience of pregnancy (Paul, 2015a), this work concerns a certain class
of experiences which by their nature cannot be the subjects of rational
decision-making. This is because they are both epistemically and per-
sonally transformative; that is, they change our points of view, including
our core preferences, and the only way to know what they are like is to
have them ourselves (Paul, 2015b). Becoming a parent, according to
Paul, is something that alters one’s core preferences in a way that – as
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it can understand. And this means that the decision to become a parent
or not cannot be evaluated rationally, since one cannot, prior to the
decision, access the preferences or values that would motivate one after
the decision, and therefore justify it. Addiction, as O’Connor describes it,
or on the model of the second form of duress we considered, may be a
transformative experience of this sort; the motivational structure of the
addict’s world may be fundamentally inaccessible to those who are not
addicted, and that of somebody recovering similarly barred to the addict.
And this would explain the difficulty we commonly have in knowing how
to morally assess the actions of addicts; we know perfectly well how these
actions would be assessed if performed by somebody whose “motiv-
ational space” is comprehensible to us, but we also know that that of
the addict is not.
Conclusions
Just as the study of addiction spans a huge number of academic discip-
lines, its philosophical study embraces a great many of philosophy’s
subdisciplines. We have considered debates here in normative and
applied ethics, the philosophy of action, metaphysics, philosophy of medi-
cine, philosophy of psychiatry, epistemology, philosophy of biology, phil-
osophy of medicine, and jurisprudence; no doubt a more comprehensive
overview would add more to the list. This reflects the rich, cross-cutting
intellectual interest of addiction as a topic of philosophical study.
It also reflects the wide-ranging and versatile toolkit which philosophers
have, over the centuries, developed for the analysis of such phenomena.
This conceptual apparatus is not proprietary; it represents a public
resource available to investigators across all the myriad fields gathered
together in this Handbook, and many more beside. As the various social
and life sciences tell us more about addiction, philosophers will continue
to be on hand to interpret and analyze the results, clarifying the issues
and – perhaps – thereby suggesting further avenues for future research.
Intellectually interesting though the philosophical study of addiction may
be in its own right, a subdiscipline where philosophers of addiction spoke
only to each other would be an arid and pointless one; the true value of
the work described in this chapter lies in its potential to enable dialogue
and collaboration between and across disciplines.
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